Partial and General Equilibrium Effects of Unemployment Insurance: Identification, Estimation and Inference

  • Datum:
  • Plats: Hörsal 2, Ekonomikum, Kyrkogårdsgatan 10 A, Uppsala
  • Doktorand: von Buxhoeveden, Mathias
  • Om avhandlingen
  • Arrangör: Nationalekonomiska institutionen
  • Kontaktperson: von Buxhoeveden, Mathias
  • Disputation

Disputation

Essay I: Wage setting models typically posit a tight relationship between the generosity of unemployment insurance (UI) and equilibrium wages. This paper estimates the effect of UI on workers’ wages. I build on a unique feature of the unemployment policy in Sweden, where workers can opt to buy supplement UI coverage above a minimum mandated level. In January 2007, the government sharply increased the price of UI, and the share of workers with supplement coverage fell from 90% to 80%. I exploit variation in the price of UI across industries to measure the effect of industry level UI-coverage on wages. My estimates suggest that a 10 percentage point reduction in the share of workers covered by supplement UI reduce wages by 5%. Since I rely on variation in UI-coverage at the industry level, these estimates contain wage adjustments from collective and individual level bargaining. Finally, I use the estimated UI-wage effect to derive bounds on worker bargaining power in a simple DMP model and find that it can be at most 0.12. This evidence supports wage setting mechanisms that tie wages to the generosity of UI.